SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ
- versus -
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLAand FRANCISCA FABELLA,
G.R. No. 132424, 02 May 2006
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/may2006/G.R.%20No.%20132424.htm#_ftn18
Under existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property: (a)accion interdictal; (b) accion publiciana; and (c) accion reivindicatoria.[6]
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).[7] In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.[8] The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess.[9]
The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.[10] Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.[11] The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession.
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year.[12] It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.[13] In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil proceeding.[14]
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.[15] Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.[16] As explained in Sarona v. Villegas[17]:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule 70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
x x x x
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the word “tolerance” confirms our view heretofore expressed that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not of forcible entry. Indeed, to hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First. Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the possessor. Violation of that right authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the rules. If one year from the forcible entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be speedy; and the possessor is deemed to havewaived his right to seek relief in the inferior court. Second, if a forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years, then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really prescribe. No matter how long such defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature, and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the action.[18] (Underlining supplied)